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that large cities were the downfall of the German people and that only a healthy peasant 
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Richard Walther Darré and how his philosophy was taken over by Himmler and fit into 
his personal needs and creed after 1941. It will shed some light on the interaction of 
Darré and Himmler and the notorious internal fights and power struggles between the 
various governmental agencies involved. The Ministry for Food and Agriculture under 
the leadership of Darré was systematically pushed into the background and all previous, 
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Their sword will become our plow, and from the tears of war the daily bread of 
future generations will grow.  
         Hitler, Mein Kampf  
  
 
National Socialist ideology was based on the doctrine of racial inequality. The 
National Socialist concept of race and living space, the preservation and the expansion 
of the Aryan people was directly linked to Nazi racial ideology via occupation and 
settlement. Adolf Hitler’s focus was on the land. The nations that inhabited the soil 
played a secondary role in his plans; he was interested in exploiting the resources and 
raw materials for the greater German nation benefiting only Aryans. The nurturing and 
fostering of the Aryan tribe (Sippenpflege) cannot be separated from the idea of 
settlement. 
Most often, occupied land is different from the homeland. The people, landscape, 
climate, natural resources, and industries have different characteristics. An occupying 
nation is able to enforce a one-way transfer or inflow of goods and services from the 
occupied land to the homeland through coercion. The objective was to make the 
occupier autarkic. Becoming autarkic was one of Hitler’s goals for Germany. By making 
the nation independent of costly foreign imports and relying more on its own resources 
or those from the occupied territories, the Nazis wanted to secure a certain standard of 
living for the German people, as well as develop a strong military. However, autarky 
was not an original idea of the Nazis. For example, the economist Werner Sombart had 
represented the thought of an “enclosed national economic area” much earlier.1 Hitler 
                                                 
1 Werner Sombart. Händler und Helden patriotische Besinnungen (Műnchen: Dunker,1915). 
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borrowed this thought but added a racial component to it. He was convinced that 
German survival, both racial and political, depended on the seizure of land in eastern 
Europe.2 Thus, Germany would not only survive but emerge as the dominant power in 
the world. 
In order to achieve this goal, functional settlements filled with carefully selected 
German people had to be established in the occupied territories and totally controlled by 
the Nazis, while the local economy had to be dominated and eventually absorbed into 
the German system. The East and especially the Ukraine, often called the bread basket 
of the East (Kornkammer des Ostens), would supply food and other riches to Germany, 
while itself staying predominantly agricultural. It would, however, take a special kind of 
man to settle under the conditions that existed there. The future settler, or Wehrbauer, 
had to be of solid racial stock, accept the Party program, live on the eastern frontier, 
and be willing to function as a soldier while at the same time cultivating and farming the 
soil. Since the East, according to Hitler’s plans would stay primarily rural, German 
peasants were the ideal type of settler. Peasants, by nature, customarily have a closer 
connection to the soil and nature, and therefore to the German spirit.3   
German industrialization in the nineteenth century had brought forward a variety 
of conflicting ideas when it came to the agrarian community.  One of them was the 
agrarian romantic movement led by Adam Műller, who feared the loss of the traditional 
German peasant. Germany was threatened by rapid industrialization and urbanization. 
                                                 
2 Henry Picker, et al. Adolf Hitler. Table Talk 1941-1944: His private conversations, (NY: Enigma, 
2000), 32. 
3 On the Deutsche Geist or German Spirit see Fritz R. Stern. The Politics of Cultural Despair. A 
Study in the Rise of Germanic Ideology. (Berkley: University of California Press 1961).  
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Following Műller’s ideas, organizations promoting colonial or settlement ideas became 
popular.   
Richard Walther Darré was one of the men influenced by Műller and the agrarian 
romanticism. The Reichsdeutsche Darré had published a book in 1926 titled Innere 
Kolonisation (internal colonization) which caught the attention of the National 
Socialists.4  In this publication, Darré looked towards the eastern areas of Europe to 
expand, not to any overseas holdings, although he was ‘colonial’ trained at the German 
Colonial School in Witzenhausen.  He argued that large cities were the downfall of the 
German people.  Races mixed and intermingled there and only a healthy peasant stock, 
would be able to ‘save’ Germany.  Gaining land became a primary goal in his writings. 
Under Darré’s definition, “Geopolitik” was the defense of the land, the defense with 
Pflug und Schwert (plow and sword) by Wehrbauern, an ‘Űberbauer-fusion’ of soldier 
and peasant. In order to accomplish these goals, new settlements had to be established 
while moving from west to east.  
As Hitler’s chief agronomist, Darré’ was put in charge of the reorganization of the 
peasants with his Reichsnährstand (Reich Food Estate), and he drew up plans for the 
resettlement of peasants in the east. For Darré, who promoted a Blut and Boden or 
blood and soil philosophy, only peasants were true Aryans. They were the only ones 
who understood the connection between blood and soil.  Therefore, they were the only 
ones qualified to fulfill the racial and ideological mission in the East.  
From the beginning, Darré and his Reichsnährstand were in competition with 
other Nazi organizations over the issue of settlement or colonization. In 1935, the Reich 
                                                 
4 Reichsdeutsche was a term generally applied to German citizens either living abroad or children 
of German citizens born abroad. 
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Office for Land-Use Regulation (Reichsstelle fűr Raumordnung) was created, with the 
goal of restructuring German peasantry (Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums). The 
Reich Office for Land Acquisition and the Reich Office for Resettlement (Reichstelle fűr 
Landbeschaffung und die Reichstelle fűr Umsiedlung) were both associated with the 
War Ministry.5 However, there was also the SS with its leader Heinrich Himmler, who 
had plans of his own to settle the East. For many years, historians believed that the 
eastern settlement plans of Himmler were nothing more than utopian fantasies. Shortly 
after Word War II, studies about the civil administration in the eastern territories 
appeared and historians looked during this period mainly at the documents used during 
the Nuremberg Trials. However, during the 1960s and 70s, the research on Nazi 
Germany shifted to the topic of the Holocaust and the role of the Wehrmacht.6 Karl 
Heinz Roth’s study in 1985 reopened the discussion of imperialistic ideas and 
rationalizations of the social and economic structures.7 Most studies that followed have 
focused on the Generalgouvernement, the former Poland, and the Ostland. Little 
attention has been devoted to specific resettlement policies. A study on German 
peasants during the Nazi reign was completed by Gustavo Corni. Corni’s monograph 
Hitler and the Peasants took a closer look at the Reichsbauernfűhrer Richard Walther 
Darré. Although Corni does not go into details about the resettlement in the future 
Lebensraum, he is able to shed light on the overall structure of the Reichsnährstand 
                                                 
5 “Wissenschaft im Dienste der Raumordnung”, NS-Landpost, Hauptblatt des 
Reichsnährstandes,(Berlin: Reichsnährstandverlag gmbH), Dec 11, 1936. from here on forward: NS-
Landpost. 
6 Jonathan Steinberg. “The Third Reich Reflected: German Civil Administration in the Occupied 
Soviet Union,” The English Historical Review, 110, (June 1995): 622. 
7 Matthias Burchard, “Der GPO, ein finsteres Kapital Berliner Wissenschaftsgeschichte”, 
Humboldt University Berlin: Working Paper 38/1997, 5. http://gplanost.x-berg.de/sgplanost.html. 
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and ideological thesis of Darré. Gustavo Corni then collaborated with Horst Gies on the 
book Blut und Boden, but although this book contains 173 primary sources, only three 
are devoted to the eastern settlement ideas of the Nazi.8 Wendy Lower’s story of 
Hegewald, largely unknown to post-war scholars, casts new light on Nazi ambitions in 
the East.9 Hegewald foreshadowed the German Wehrbauern or Űber-peasant 
settlement that never actually materialized. 
The specific focus of this study is on the original Hegewald resettlement ideas of 
Richard Walther Darré and how his philosophy was taken over by Himmler and fit into 
his personal needs and creed after 1941. It will shed some light on the interaction of 
Darré and Himmler and the notorious internal fights and power struggles between the 
various governmental agencies involved. The Ministry for Food and Agriculture under 
the leadership of Darré was systematically pushed into the background and all previous, 
often publicly announced re-settlement policies were altered; Darré was pushed aside 
once the eastern living space was actually occupied. 
Previous studies have focused on the lives of famous Nazis: Hitler, Himmler, 
Göring, or Goebbels. In order to understand Darré and his resettlement ideology, the 
structure and developments of German agriculture during the early twentieth century 
must be briefly examined.  Agriculture cannot be seen in a vacuum but only in 
connection with other factors such as Landflucht (flight from the land), and romantic 
agrarian movements such as the Artamanen, which developed especially after World 
War I.  
                                                 
8 Gustavo Corni and Horst Gies.  Blut und Boden: Rassenideologie und Agrarpolitik im Staat 
Hitlers. (Idstein: Schulz-Kirchner, 1994).  
9 Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine. (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2005),165. 
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“Gläubig dienen wir der Erde und dem grossen deutschen Werde”10 
 
One of the original, more ‘purist’ Lebensraum ideas originated in the Artamanen 
movement.  While the term Lebensraum, which was made popular by Friedrich Ratzel, 
and originally only referred to biological theories, became popular after World War I, a 
new set of ideological expansionary political ideas was added in the mid-1920s. The 
Artamanen were a phenomenon that developed parallel to the Wandervögel movement 
in the 1920s11.  Wandervögel youth limited their meetings and gatherings mostly to 
weekends and time off school or work and had no political programs, “but were 
animated by youth’s determination to express itself unfettered by the older 
generation.”12 The Artamanen movement tried, at least for a few years, to captivate the 
imagination of a wider circle of German youth.  Some of Darré’s initial ideas of ‘blood 
and soil’ originated in the Artamanen movement and several future Nazi leaders were 
involved in Artamanen groups while growing up; the most famous being Heinrich 
Himmler.13  About 80% of the Artamanen were National Socialists, the rest came from 
smaller groups such as Jung-Stahlhelm, Werwolf or Landbűndler.14 The idea behind the 
movement was that there should be no economic driving force behind a settlement, but 
a ‘völkische’ instead. Artamanen saw it as a necessity to develop a reassignment of 
                                                 
10 Artamanen slogan, from SS Hauptamt, Schulungsamt 1941, 94. “We are devoted serving the 
soil and the great Germanic coming”. 
11 Literally translated, Wandervögel means ‘Hiking or Walking Birds’. 
12 SHAEF evaluation and dissemination section, “The Hitler Jugend”, U.S.1944, 3. 
13 For an account of Himmler’s earlier years and his involvement with the Artamanen see Bradley 
F. Smith, Heinrich Himmler: a Nazi in the making, 1900-1926 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
1971),159ff. 
14 “Die Artamanenbewegung”, Völkischer Beobachter, (June 22, 1927). from here on forward: VB. 
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German living space (“die Notwendigkeit einer Neuordnung des bisherigen deutschen 
Lebensraumes wurde erkannt”) without the stigma of annihilation of other races.15 It 
was during this time that Himmler and Darré became friends, but Corni believes this 
friendship was short-lived and superficial.16 
With the end of World War I and Germany’s loss of overseas colonies, a close 
look must be taken at the “longing for the East”, peasants, and the rise of National 
Socialism. Analysis of the German demand for the East will demonstrate the close 
connection with the history of geopolitics and the rationalization for eastern settlements. 
Hitler was able to combine these elements and incorporate them into his policies. 
Considering that once the East was occupied, Poland in 1939, parts of Russia after 
1941, time is spent on the topic of ethnic Germans, since they were the only ones who 
ever lived in Hegewald. The organization of these territories, the eastern plans and their 
implications on settlement policies were very important and played a crucial role during 
this time. Finally, the relationship and hierarchy between the agencies operating in the 
East and Himmler’s own ideas of the settlement of peasants as Wehrbauern is 
analyzed. 
                                                 
15 Alwin Rosenberg, Bäuerliche Siedlungsarbeit des Bundes Artam, Jahrbuch des Archivs der 
Deutschen Jugendbewegung, Vol 9, 1977: 202. 
16 Gustavo Corni, Hitler and the Peasant: Agrarian Policy of the Third Reich, 1930-1939 (New 
York: Berg, 1990), 246. 
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CHAPTER 2 
GEOPOLITICS, HISTORY AND THE RATIONALIZATION  
FOR EASTERN SETTLEMENTS 
 
In the strictest sense, geopolitics, a mixture of geography, political science, 
social-economy, and history is a sub-branch of political geography.  While the Swede 
Rudolf Kjellen coined the term before World War I, the idea originated with his former 
teacher Friedrich Ratzel;17and it was through his contribution that geopolitics and its 
wider field of geography received a Darwinistic undertone.  Geopolitics was not a widely 
recognized field in Germany during the Wilhelmina era.  There was no widely read 
literature available. It was a very specialized field and no continuous development was 
passed on from one social scientist to the next.  Ideas and theories in this field were not 
passed on from one academic generation to the next, and even though geopolitical 
ideas existed, no “school” or similar body with common ideas existed.  
After Versailles, geopolitics became a hot topic in the newly-formed Weimar 
Republic, and the two experts in the field were Otto Maull and Karl Haushofer. However, 
the topic was not limited to only Germany; Halford Mackinder and James Fairgrieve, two 
British social scientists, also published works in the field of expansion theory. Karl 
Haushofer published the journal Zeitschrift fűr Geopolitik. One of his favorite topics was 
the critical look at the Versailles Treaty and the repercussions for Germany. Haushofer 
also believed that Germany was overpopulated and should be allowed to expand in 
order to survive, a theory later picked up by Hitler. Geopolitics, as advocated by the 
Nazis, was based on the presumed inferiority of the Slavs while highlighting German 
                                                 
17 Ratzel’s original ideas never included race in expansion, but was limited to “die Lehre űber den 
Staat als geographischen Organismus oder Erscheinung im Raum” (teachings on the State as a 
geographic organism or a feature in the space). 
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cultural superiority. Germany’s interest in “nation ideas” manifested itself later in widely 
read publications such as Volk ohne Raum by Hans Grimm.18  Geopolitics moved into 
the mainstream in the 1930s, no longer limited to academia, while at the same time 
shifted its focus from colonial possessions in Africa and other overseas holdings to 
future settlements in the East. 
Political geography and geopolitics were not seen as interchangeable terms, 
rather, geopolitics was seen as the “Lehre von der Erdgebundenheit der politischen 
Vorgänge” (teachings of the bondage of the soil with interrelationship of the soil and 
political events).19  Political geography looks at national borders: at their shape, length, 
development and many other aspects, at the relationship of border vs. economy and 
settlement structure, but also race, nation or cultural expanse.20 The last parts of the 
definition, especially, overlap with geopolitics which looks at the overall standing of the 
border according to the needs of the State. Under the disguise of geopolitics, Hitler 
justified his settlement and expansionistic ideas when he claimed that Europe was not a 
geographic entity, but a racial entity.21  Otto Maull went one step further and 
subcategorized geopolitics into space, logistics and defense-geopolitics, colonial-
geopolitics, economic-geopolitics, international-geopolitics and the Volkstums-
geopolitics.22 Natural and cultural elements of the state are “political space organisms” 
and are clearly part of political geography. Geopolitics is influenced by space demands 
                                                 
18 Hans Grimm, Volk ohne Raum (Műnchen: Albert Langen, 1926). 
19 Otto Maull, Das Wesen der Geopolitik (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner,1941), 27. 
20 See also the essay on Der Räumliche Aufbau der Grenze on natural border vs. state border. 
Odal, Heft 8, August 1939, 665ff. 
21 Picker, Table Talks, 24. 
22 Maull, Geopolitik, 39. 
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of the State. The State also has to secure its space. Space-geopolitics is the foundation 
for the defense-geopolitics which developed from geography, geopolitics and defense 
elements.23  
   Ratzel’s earlier ideas included the idea that State borders were not fixed; they 
were only temporary, since nations are constantly growing.  This thought was picked up 
again by Haushofer, who put a slightly different spin on it, which the Nazis welcomed; 
borders in their view became insignificant. However, Haushofer and Hitler differed on 
several points. Haushofer promoted in his writings a peaceful, non-violent expansion 
into the East, in addition to the notion that a nation needed both a navy and an army, 
whereas Hitler thought only a land army, but strong one, was necessary.  
 
Germany’s Past in the East, the Ostsiedlung 
Germanic people such as the Goths or Vandals already had established 
settlements in prehistoric times in the areas around the rivers Bug and Dnjestr in 
eastern central Europe.  Later, “Germania Slavica” was a part of Europe inhabited in the 
eighth century by Slavs, but Franks and Bavarians had also pushed their way into the 
region and established settlements among the Slavs.  Charlemagne’s empire had 
extended deep into the eastern pagan areas of Europe and fighting with various Slavic 
tribes occurred frequently.  By sending missionaries with the settlers, the areas were 
slowly Christianized. Around the twelfth century, Germans began to push even further 
east and south and expanded into regions previously inhabited only by Balts or Slavs, 
as well as into the regions of present day Hungary and Slovenia. During medieval times, 
                                                 
23 ibid, 48. 
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settlements east of the Elbe River were mostly conducted in a peaceful manner.  
However, in the beginning of the thirteenth century, Russia felt threatened by the 
expanding Germans from the West, especially the Teutonic Knights or Deutscher 
Ritterorden, who invaded Russia from Estonia but were ultimately defeated.  Even 
though the knights’ power declined over the centuries and they lost influence, especially 
in their secular holdings, the Nazis in the twentieth century revived the idea of cultural 
expansion to the east.24  By the fourteenth century, most profitable areas along rivers, 
the coast and important trade routes had been settled. The new German settlers usually 
brought new technology, agricultural innovations and administrative improvements with 
them, and the native population assimilated quickly German culture and language. 
German influence and population in the region grew very rapidly during this time. 
The next wave of settlers to the east started with the German-born Czarina, 
Catherine the Great. After the Seven Years’ War, impoverished conditions existed in 
large parts of Europe, and Catherine started an aggressive campaign of immigration to 
Russia. Through a special manifesto, many Germans answered the call to "paradise." 
Between the years 1764 to 1767, Germans colonized 104 villages in the isolated Volga 
valley of Russia near the city of Saratov. Altogether, 6,433 families totaling 23,109 
people migrated to Russia.25 Foreign immigrants, especially Mennonites who originally 
came from Holland through Prussia, began to settle the region known as New Russia in 
1787.  Within twenty years, the German population in the Volga region grew to 27,000 
colonists. This area, north of the Caspian Sea became an autonomous Soviet Republic 
                                                 
24 In the section ‘Raum und Volk’ in the NS-Landpost, a drawing of a knight dressed in full armor 
with the symbol of the Teutonic Knights, a single black cross, on his shield is standing on one side, while 
a blond peasant is standing on the other side. 
25 Karl Schoepke, Deutsche Ostsiedlung (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1941), 56. 
 12
in European Russia, with a population of 571,089. In 1926, 67% of the people claimed 
to be of German decent.   
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, historian Karl Adolf Menzel argued in 
his book Die Geschichte der Deutschen (History of the Germans) that because of this 
century-old influx and movement of Germans into the eastern regions of Europe, 
Germans had a legitimate claim to territories in the East.26This mostly Prussian concept 
of internal colonization was developed in the late 18th century.  Members of the 
dominant nationality or race were settled into areas weakly held by the indigenous 
group and then strengthened their own group in the area.27  The justification for this 
internal settlement was higher productivity by the German settlers compared to the 
native population.28 
 
Wherever National Socialism settles, it inspires happiness and satisfaction for the 
settler and in many ways an advantage for the State 
      
     Brekenfeld, Wehrkraft und Siedlung 
 
Resettlement had many meanings and took on many forms in the Third Reich. 
German words which have similar meanings are Neubesiedlung, Umsiedlung, 
Wiederansiedlung but also Wiedereingliederung; equivalent English words are 
relocation or reintegration.  Resettlement can be either voluntary or forced and can even 
include deportation.   As Jűrgen Zimmerer pointed out, the commonly used Eurocentric 
term “occupation” enforces certain restrictions and a better description of Nazi aims 
                                                 
26 Karl Adolf Menzel. Die Geschichte der Deutschen (Breslau: Grass und Barth, 1823) 
27 Robert Lewis Koehl, RKFDV: German resettlement and population policy, 1939-1945; a history 
of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 
1957, 231. 
28 Maull, Geopolitik, 57ff. 
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would be “colonialism, since occupation is generally regarded as a temporary 
phenomenon.”29  
The Nazi rationalization for resettling people was not just to settle for social 
reasons, to make the un-propertied into landowners, but also for racial, national political 
and defense reasons.  Therefore, a healthy settlement was never just for social motives; 
all reasons had to work together.  By bringing the word “healthy” into the equation of 
settlement, the Nazis were able to justify the accompanying word, which was “racially.” 
 
Denn ein Volk hat nur Anrecht auf den Raum den es sich durch Arbeit als 
Kulturraum erworben hat und auf die Raumreserve die es in absehbarer Zeit fűr 
seinen wachsenden Körper braucht. 
        Maull, Geopolitik 30 
Space or Raum was sub-divided by National Socialist thinkers into a natural (a 
geographic entity) landscape or Naturlandschaft and a man-made Kulturlandschaft. The 
first was seen as a specific piece of earth with all its  natural factors such as hills, 
mountains or rivers. The latter was an outgrowth of the natural landscape, altered by 
humans.  This outgrowth or difference between the two spaces was the one the Nazis 
were most concerned with, since a man-made cultural space projected the character 
and civilization of the local population. The cultural space was an emergence only of a 
creative population.31 This geographic space grew with political power.  Both-natural 
                                                 
29 Jűrgen Zimmer, The Birth of the Ostland out of the spirit of Colonialism. Patterns of Prejudice, 
39, (2): 199. 
30 A nation has only a right to space if they acquired it through their cultural work and if they need 
that space reserve in the near future for their growing population. 
31 Hans Graul and Gisela Hildebrandt. Beiträge zur Siedlungsgeographie des General 
Governement. Jahrbuch 1941 (Krakau: Burgverlag, 1943), 218. 
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and cultural-are just steppingstones to the ultimate goal of political space.32 To secure 
the soil in the East, settling culture and peasants in these regions were now seen as the 
prime tasks of the nation. Numerous articles and books pointed out the rundown, 
degenerate Slavic peasants in their shabby old huts, and the primitive methods they 
were using to work the soil. In the spring of 1935, the NS-Landpost ran a report titled 
Land ohne Brot (land without bread) in which Egon v. Lausser depicted the poor 
conditions in Russia among the peasants and workers. Once German peasants would 
settle these troubled regions, disorder and confusion would be replaced by order, the 
chaos and confusion eliminated down to the last details. New words in conjunction with 
settlements emerged now in publications such as Neuordnung, Neuordnungsgebiet, 
Neuordnungsplan (new order, new order territory, new order plan). The condition of the 
soil itself was also important in Nazi ideology. German scientists concluded that for 
centuries, the Slavs had aggregated the soil, and through unsystematic planning driven 
only by greed, deforestation of once fertile land, destruction of the soil, and disruption of 
the natural water flow had occurred. The result was an arid landscape.33  This process 
was generalized into the term “Veröstlichung” (easternization) of the landscape, and the 
Nazi planners felt that they had a duty to stop this process. Hitler felt obligated to 
Europeanize the Asiatic steppe.34 
There was a wave of books and articles in the early 1930s on the topic of 
Volkstum in the East, the German culture, historical details on settlements, and the 
Teutonic Knights.  Monographs like Germanische Wanderung in den Sűdosten 
                                                 
32 Ibid, 219. 
33 “Planung und Siedlung im Wartheland”, VB, Dec 8, 1942, 6. 
34  Picker,Table Talk, 68. 
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(Germanic migration into the Southeast) showed how Germanic people and their 
ancestors had moved peacefully into new eastern regions for centuries. 35  While 
individuals had a variety of reasons to leave their native countries, it was not the 
restlessness or the discontent for the homeland, but the hunger for one’s own soil 
(Hunger nach eigenem Boden) that motivated people.  Books appeared like the Neue 
Deutsche Osten, a bibliography about the newly acquired eastern regions, containing 
references on settlement, geography and economy, and reinforcing the Nazi picture of 
the East.36 In the eyes of the Nazi administration, these books became a necessity; 
Ostforschung or eastern research and the analysis of war, as well as the reorganization 
of the East were top priorities. With materials like these, the Nazis were able to connect 
the general public the East with its past, and explain eastern European history to the 
common man. These publications increased the awareness of the future Lebensraum 
among the German public. Most of them started with a short general history of the East, 
migration, settlements of Germans, the innovations these early settlers brought to the 
regions, followed by the fragmentation and disintegration of the East, and the glorious 
Third Reich, uniting all Germans from the East and West for a thousand years to 
come.37 Many Germans accepted the Nazi ideology of the specific role and 
responsibility the nation had to fulfill as the bulwark against Bolshevism.38  When 
                                                 
35 “Deutsches Volkstum in fremdem Raum”, NS-Landpost, Jan 3, 1941, 15. 
36 Paul Ritterbusch, Der neue Deutsche Osten, eine Bibliography.  Berichte zur Raumforschung 
und Raumordnung  (Leipzig: Koehler Verlag, 1940) 
37 See on the Volkstums topic Karl Schöpke, Deutsche Ostsiedlung; Karl Thalheim und Hillen 
Ziegfeld, Der deutsche Osten; and more specific oriented Imma von Gűnther-Swart. Grundlagen der 
Landwirtschaft im Reichsgau Wartehland und im Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreussen. (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 
1941) 
38 Fritz Sűllwold, Deutsche Normalbűrger 1933-1945.  Erfahrungen, Einstellungen, Reaktionen. 
(Műnchen: F.A. Herbig, 2001),144. 
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German soldiers reached the East, their belief in a backward and ancient region was 
reinforced, and the years of propaganda coverage on the mismanagement of kolkhoz 
(Soviet Collecting Farm), their inadequate equipment, and the incompetent local 
municipalities paid off.39  However, it was always the noble peasant, not the diplomat, 
nor the statesman, the bourgeoisie, or the worker who was tied with the East. It was 
always the peasantry who in the past and in the future would bring culture to the East.40 
In Hitler’s view, the Ukrainian peasants, especially, had no notion of duty, but a German 
peasant was moved by a liking for progress:  “He thinks of his children.”41 
Lebensraum had now become the new term for an old goal of colonial 
expansion: German superiority, cultural superiority, the “culture-bringer” to a benighted 
East, continuing the Imperial tradition of Germany to bring culture to Eastern Europe.42 
In Hitler’s mind, “Slavs are a mass of born slaves, who feel the need of a master.”43 In 
December 1940 it became clear that previous colonial politics had been officially 
replaced by settlement policies.  The justification was simple: the Latin word “colere” 
meant to cultivate or work the fields and in medieval times, the term colonia was used to 
identify new settlements.44 
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41 Picker, Table Talk, 33. 
42 Koehl, RKFDV, 233. 
43 Picker, Table Talk, 33. 
44 Neue Kolonialpolitik, Raum & Volk, Jan 13, 1940, T-71, RWM, reel 138, frame 642162. 
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Besides reclaiming the East for settlement, Hitler’s other goal was to exploit the 
local economies and natural resources for Germany’s benefit.45  His vision of the world 
power, Germany, included an autarkic country with millions of Aryans who eventually 
had to be fed. Therefore, it became necessary to approach the food question from a 
more scientific point of view.46  Darré’s agricultural specialists had collected voluminous 
data on harvests in the various sections in the East, comparing and analyzing their 
findings. One bad harvest could set back the goal for autarky for months if not years, 
and could have a negative effect on German society. Everything that could be controlled 
would be controlled, from the seeds to be used in a specific region and the germination 
period, to what fertilizer had to be applied for which crop, and under what soil 
conditions.  Essay after essay, report after report by Hitler’s agronomists proved the 
inferiority of the eastern peasants compared to their fellow Germans.  The Slavic 
peasants were unable to get the maximum potential from their soil.  Friedrich 
Christiansen-Weniser, head of the agricultural department in Pulawy, compared the 
harvests of cereal and grains of Germany to the Vistula region between the years 1934 
to 1938, and concluded that the low output in the Vistula region was directly linked to 
collective agriculture. By applying a scientific approach to melioration and diversification 
of the fodder basis and change in agricultural structure (currently small farm which 
inhibit production) the crop yield could be increased over the next years.47 However, 
                                                 
45 USHMM, RG 31.002M, Reel 6. Allgemeines Ziel der deutschen Verwaltung 1942. “Die 
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erschöpfendem Maße zu Gunsten der deutschen Kriegsfűhrung ausgenutzt werden.” 
46 Sűllwold, Normalbűrger, 190. He reported that 71% of Germans believed that the autarky 
policies were the right thing to do, while only 4% thought it was wrong. On the other hand 21% believed 
that Germany had to get space in the east to survive, while 26% said it was only propaganda, 198. 
47 Institute fur Deutsche Ostarbeit, Jahrbuch 1941, (Krakau: Burg Verlag, 1941), 255. 
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before any of these goals could be accomplished, the East needed to be conquered, 
and millions of people, including ethnic Germans, had to be either resettled, removed, 




MOVEMENT, SETTLEMENT, AND REPATRIATION OF ETHNIC GERMANS 
The war between Germany and Poland began on September 1, 1939. Two days 
later, France and Great Britain declared war on Germany. Since Germany and the 
Soviet Union had signed a publicly announced non-aggression pact in August 1939, the 
Red Army crossed over into Poland after German troops had reached Warsaw.  
However, there was a secret clause attached to the treaty which provided for the 
division of Poland and the Baltic area into Soviet and German spheres of interest in 
which the two countries would exploit these regions.48 
After Hitler annexed the old provinces of West-Prussia, Upper Silesia and Posen, 
the German-occupied central region of Poland was renamed General-gouvernement.  
With these annexations and the occupation of Poland, hundreds of thousands of so-
called ethnic Germans were now directly under German rule, and by bringing the ethnic 
Germans “heim ins Reich” (back into the Reich or their homeland) Hitler had completed 
his first step of uniting all Germans under one government.  Thousands of ethnic 
German families followed the call of the Fűhrer by giving up their homes in the outposts 
of the East and moving into the secure space of the new eastern territories.49   
                                                 
48 Manfred Messerschmidt, in Germany and World War Two, vol I (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 
2000), 708. see also Gerhard F. Weinberg. Germany and the Soviet Union 1939-1941. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1954). 
49 Konrad Meyer. Bodenordnung, (Berlin: Verlag Walter de Gryter,1940), 16. 
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Figure 1.  Heinrich Himmler welcomes an ethnic German from Galicia in Przemysl, Poland50 
 
Agreements were signed between Germany and Russia on October 15, 1939 in 
Estonia, on October 30 in Latvia, as well as on November 3 concerning the eastern 
Polish areas and the ethnic Germans living in those places.51 By December of 1939, 
about 65,000 Baltic Germans were on the move. The Polish transfer was overseen by a 
joint German-Russian commission leading to  another 130,000 ethnic Germans entering 
the Reich.52 The transfer was voluntary, but the Volhynia Germans, especially, left with 
enthusiasm since the Soviets had treated them badly. By February 1940, more than 
120,000 ethnic Germans from Volhynia, Galicia and Bialystok had crossed the German-
Russian border moving west.53 Baltic Germans were moved by rail and ship during the 
winter 1939/40.54 This group was also the most disappointed by the resettlement. The 
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52 Consisting of 307 SS officials. 
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majority of them had lived in cities, and were now settled in rural areas.55 However, 
Hitler granted an exclusive status to some of the Baltic Germans who had owned large 
estates in the past.  
Heinrich Himmler, already in charge of the German police and the SS, was 
named Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of Germandom (Reichskommissar für 
die Festigung Deutschtums) or RKFVD, headquartered in Berlin-Halensee.56  With this 
move, Himmler and his staff became the most important think tank and planning 
authority in redesigning the conquered territories in the East.57  This nomination was not 
without controversy among other Nazi leaders, and the old dispute between Darré and 
Himmler seemed to widen over the authority question of the ethnic Germans. Himmler 
felt that his SS was in charge because in his mind, these Germans were not to be 
settled, but only temporarily relocated. A permanent solution could only be found after 
the war with veterans and soldiers.58  
The RKFVD now ran the daily administration and the execution of the 
resettlement of the ethnic Germans. The first course of action of the RKFVD was to 
determine who was considered Volksdeutsch (ethnic German) and who was not. In 
order to determine the status of these people, it was decided that being ethnic German 
was defined as people claiming German descent, but who were not citizens of 
Germany. One of Himmler’s first acts was the implementation of the German National 
List (Deutsche Volksliste, DVL) to determine officially the “true” nationality of an ethnic 
                                                 
55 “Die Umsiedler werden immer seßhafter”, OB, Jan 5, 1942. 
56 By the spring of 1944, the headquarters were moved to Vilshofen in Bavaria. 
57 Karl Ditt, The Perception and Conservation of Nature in the Third Reich.  Planning 
Perspectives, 15 (2000): 174. 
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Ostforschung. 30 (1981) 4: 539. 
 22
German according to the Nuremberg laws. Only ethnic Germans were guaranteed their 
civil rights.59 The DVL was divided into four categories: Category I was reserved for the 
so-called “Bekenntnis-deutsche,”(Germans by Commitment) Category II were people 
considered “deutsch stämmig, ” but was also reserved for former Polish citizens who 
had renounced their Polish citizenship before September 1, 1939; these two groups 
were granted immediate citizenship and were also eligible to become members of the 
NSDAP. Families or persons with at least three German grandparents fell into these two 
categories.  Category III was reserved for Poles with “Aryan” traits such as physical 
features (tall, blond, etc), and who would be capable of becoming German (zur 
Eindeutschung fähig). Persons in this category had to wait ten years to become citizens. 
In addition, persons who were 25-50% German were admitted into Category III, as well 
as persons living in so-called “Mischehen” (mixed-marriages) where “Deutschtum” 
dominated.60 The third category was widely discussed and the most misunderstood.61 
People of German decent who did not want to be assimilated fell into Category IV.62 
Poles with relatives in the Reich, or those who had fought during World War I on the 
German side, and/or received medals could not be included in the list.63 In other words, 
if one had no German blood, he or she could never become a member of the German 
“Volksgemeinschaft”. Besides registering with the DVL, it became mandatory from June 
                                                 
59 German citizens living in the eastern occupied territories had the same civil rights and duties 
than Germans in the Reich. Amtsblatt  5, May 16, 1942,116. 
60 Anerkennung als Volksdeutsche, T-175, roll 72, frame 2589012. 
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1942 for ethnic Germans over the age of sixteen to register with German government 
authorities.64 
To give the scheme of moving and resettling of people a legitimate appearance, 
several new organizations and corporations were founded. One of these organization 
was the Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhandgesellschaft m.b.H. Niederlassung Posen 
(German Re-settlement-Trust Company Posen Subsidiary). This corporation acted as a 
middleman between the ethnic Germans and the government when it came to loans, 
but also to assess existing assets.65In addition, they kept meticulous records of every 
resettled ethnic German.66 Ethnic Germans were able to register at their local 
municipalities, and most major newspapers in the East ran weekly Amtliche 
Bekanntmachungen (official announcements) on how to register.67 Settlers who were 
officially recognized by Himmler could receive pension or retirement benefits from the 
Reich.68 
The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, Vo-Mi (Racial German Assistant Office), 
established in 1936, was in charge of the ethnic Germans, while the Foreign 
Organization of the NSDAP was in charge of Germans abroad.69 However, when it 
came to administering the ethnic Germans in the Ukraine and especially in Hegewald, 
Winniza, Halbstadt and Kronau (Alexanderstadt), Himmler put his RKFVD over the Vo-
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Foreigners were defined as non-ethnic Germans. Citizens of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania before 
Russian takeover were exempt. 
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Mi.70 The second transfer of re-settlers started in the summer of 1940 and this time, 
close to 100,000 Germans from Bessarabia and 40,000 from North Bukovina were 
moved from their land. By the end of that year, another 30,000 Germans from the 
General Gouvernement were resettled. Several ministries in Berlin assumed the 
responsibilities for ethnic Germans, Reichsdeutsche, and Germans living abroad.  The 
Vo-Mi administration called upon the resettled ethnic Germans to submit diaries, official 
papers, documents, pictures, and letters with the justification of collecting these sources 
for future generations to read.71 
Everything changed on the 22nd of June 1941, when the German armed forces 
attacked the USSR. From August 23, 1939 until this day, the two governments had 
remained at peace due to the non-aggression pact that  Ribbentrop and Molotov had 
signed in Moscow. However, now the General- gouvernement was no longer the buffer 
zone between Russia and Germany.  Hitler’s goal in this attack, named Barbarossa, 
was to accomplish the takeover of space in the USSR to the line of Astrachan-Arkangel, 
and therefore move Germany’s border east to the periphery of her military field of 
interest.72 The Ukraine was to be converted into a protectorate, and while a military 
border at the Urals was to be built, the formation of a military power east of the Urals 
had to be prevented (nur der Deutsche darf Waffen tragen, only Germans can bear 
arms).73   
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There was no exact data available on how many ethnic Germans lived in the 
USSR, but the last population count executed by the Soviets estimated that 1,423,530 
ethnic Germans lived inside its borders.74 To plan better and efficiently manage the 
cluster of ethnic Germans living there, the Reich started to collect data and generated 
statistics on the groups.75 This became more and more necessary since large groups of 
ethnic Germans from the “altsowjet” areas refused to settle in the Reich, but were now 
looked upon as a future labor force.76 Additionally, wherever possible ethnic Germans 
were moved from their previous scattered settlements (Streusiedlungen) into built-up 
areas controlled and managed by the SS. Capital and goods needed for these 
movements came from confiscated Jewish estates.77 
In 1942, the Eastern Institute for National Education and Recreation (Ostinstitute 
fűr Volksbildung und Freizeitgestaltung) was established. The goal of the institute was 
to support ethnic Germans in job searches. G. von Poehl researched the ethnic German 
population in Wolhynia in 1941 and according to his findings, 84.2% claimed German as 
their mother tongue.78 Although many claimed to be “fluent” in German, language 
courses and seminars in race, space, and economic matters were also offered by the 
Institute.79 Since the resettled Germans were expected to work predominantly in 
agriculture, another objective of the institute was to “sell” peasant life to them. Darré’s 
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RNS had no input in these decisions or policy making. In order to educate the ethnic 
Germans in Nazi ideology and in the spirit of the Fűhrer quickly, compulsory school 
attendance was implemented for all children. It was now mandatory to attend school for 
a total of eight years.80  
The support for the ethnic Germans was not limited to ideological schooling. The 
Party, through the help of various other governmental organizations such as the 
Reichsbund der Deutschen Schwestern, Reichs-arbeitsdienst (Reich Labor Service), 
League of German Girls (Bund deutscher Mädel), or the Red Cross, had set up an 
elaborate system of services to care for this group. It was expected that girls would 
serve their compulsory year in the East not only to help the ethnic Germans, but also to 
experience life in the occupied territories and to prepared for a future in the East.81 The 
Reich’s public welfare system stretched beyond its old borders. Apparel and other 
commonly used household items were dispensed and in “Nähstuben” (sewing groups) 
women came together and mended torn and worn-out clothes. One-hundred public day-
care centers, run by the state, looked after more than 10,000 children in the region of 
Dnjepropetrowsk in 1943.  One hundred more were planned.  The six existing children’s 
homes were furnished with crafts and toys made by wounded German soldiers in 
military hospitals.82 Himmler’s Hegewald employed a Kindergärtnerin in June 1943, but 
they had openings for four more aides and two certified kindergarten teachers.83In 
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August of 1943, three women from the Reich worked in the Outreach Center for 
mothers and children (Hilfsstelle fűr Mutter und Kind) in the Zhytomyr district, with two 
vacant positions, while in the general district of Dnjepropetrowsk, four such centers 
already existed and thirteen more were planned. By the end of that month, a total of 222 
German day care centers operated in the occupied Ukraine, with three in Hegewald 
alone. 
By the end of 1942, the resettlement of ethnic Germans was more or less 
completed and emphasis now shifted to helping and supporting these people in their 
new homeland.84 SS-Gruppenfűhrer Ulrich Greifelt detailed the problems Germany 
faced during a settlement and trade show in Posen. The two most important issues 
were seen as repatriation of ethnic Germans and the settlement of Reichsdeutsche in 
the East. During the same event, Dr. Konrad Meyer-Hetling, the director of the Institute 
for Agrarian Policy at the University Berlin, highlighted the national socialist settlement 
plans and hoped to incorporate faculty of universities into his “Raum” research.85 
Meyer-Hetling was head of the planning office of the Reich Commission for the 
Strengthening for Germandom, the Stabshauptamt, and of the Central Land Office 
(Zentralbodenamt), and later became the head of the Committee for Resettlement in the 
occupied eastern territories.  The universities eagerly answered the call to duty and 
offered the following 1942 winter semester classes and seminars with such titles as 
“Landschaft und Bauten” (Landscape and Buildings), “Mensch und Klima” (People and 
Climate), or “Versandung Europas” (Europe’s Sand Filling).86  It appeared that the Nazis 
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had set up an elaborate system to help the resettled ethnic Germans, but during a 
conference in 1943, it became clear that the support had since broken down and all the 
efforts were short lived.87 By 1944, the advance of the Red Army made it necessary to 
evacuate and move the ethnic Germans again.88 The costs were paid by the 
Reichsfűhrer-SS and his RKFVD.89 
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CHAPTER 4 
ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN TERRITORIES 
In early March 1940, Hans Frank, the Governor-General of occupied Poland, 
declared that the former Poland would always stay under German jurisdiction. The 
Ukraine and the Baltic States would not be independent entities, therefore making it 
possible to implement long-term plans.90  In just a few months, Germany had depleted 
the economy of the General Gouvernement, moving goods and raw materials back to 
the Reich.  The Polish people were allowed only a reduced standard of living, much 
lower than their counterparts in the Reich.91 Frank also saw the General Gouvernement 
as the farthest outpost of an administration run using the Reich methods, since the 
colonial landscape only began further east in the Ukraine and Ostland.92  Hitler was 
thinking in terms of a German protectorate over the Ukraine for roughly twenty-five 
years.93 The Fűhrer summed up his ideas for the East in more simplistic words: “The 
Russian space is our India.  Like the English, we shall rule this empire with a handful of 
men.”94 The newly acquired eastern territories would replace former overseas colonial 
regions and become the European colonial lands of the future. The editor of the 
Deutsche Monatshefte, Victor Kauder, predicted that with the glorious victory over the 
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Bolsheviks, the final “order of the East” would be possible and the natural reorganization 
(Neuordnung) would also bring the longed-for European “Grosswirtschaftsraum.”95 
Most of the laws governing the Reich were simply applied to the East.96  Some 
were as simple as restaurant and bar ordinances, regulations about fishing in municipal 
waters, or as complex as personal, family, or inheritance laws.97 Civil marriages in the 
East (and the preferred ones by the Nazis) could only be performed by a German 
registrar. In addition, marriages between German citizens and non-citizens were 
declared void and were no longer performed.98 Tax laws also applied to the East, the 
only exception being for Germans who settled there after June 22, 1941 and who were 
exempt from the supplemental war tax.99 Russian law no longer applied once an area 
was occupied by German troops.100 Jurisdiction in the occupied territories was divided 
between the Foreign Office, in charge of matters dealing with other countries, and the 
occupied areas in conjunction with the Reichsminister for Occupied Eastern Territories.  
The army represented the Reich in matters dealing with civilian issues until a civilian 
German administration could be put in place, while political leadership and all other 
matters, including settlement policies, fell under the jurisdiction of Himmler’s 
ministry.101In 1943, the “Verwaltungsfűhrer” (VF) were appointed by order of Himmler.  
The new positions were similar to those of civil servants (Beamte) in the Reich, 
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however, they did not pay into a pension plan and were required to wear a 
uniform.102Again, the RNS, now under the tutelage of Herbert Backe had little or no 
presence in the eastern territories. 
Generalplan Ost 
Most historians date the first draft of the Generalplan Ost (GPO) around July 
1941. However, the earliest time any plan was mentioned was in February 1940, when 
SS-Brigardefűhrer Ulrich Greifelt briefed party officials and others in the “Zentrale 
Dienststellen” (central offices) on a Generalplan fűr den Osten compiled by then SS- 
Obersturmbannfűhrer Prof. Dr. Konrad Meyer-Hetling.103 About a year and a half later 
and after being promoted to SS-Oberfűhrer, Meyer-Hetling, head of the Planungsamt in 
the RKFDV, submitted another draft of the GPO.104 The GPO was a long-term tool for 
the creation of settlements in the East which would be run by the SS under Himmler’s 
control. The main idea of the plan included agrarian settlements in the eastern territories 
with the establishment of a healthy peasantry. In order to succeed with the settlement in 
the occupied territories, it was proposed to establish a standardized authority under the 
auspices of the RKFDV. All future territories would also be subordinate to the 
Reichsfűhrer SS.  While the GPO is the best known proposal, other planning such as in 
the field of geopolitics, developed as parallels. Prior to Meyer-Hetling’s proposal, 
Heinrich Himmler even presented a six page, handwritten “Denkschrift” for the treatment 
of the people in the East to Hitler in May 1940.  Himmler claimed that he had the best 
                                                 
102 “Das Verwaltungsfűhrerkorps”, OB, Feb 3, 1943. 
103 OB, Feb 3, 1940, 1. see also: Mechthild Rőssler, Sabine Schleiermacher, and Codula 
Tollmien, Der Generalplan Ost: Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Planungs-und Vernichtungspolitik 
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993), 12, and Czeslaw Madajczyk. Der General Plan Ost. Polish Western 
Affairs, (III), 1962, 391. 
104 By the end of the war, Meyer-Hetling held the rank of SS-Obergruppenfűhrer. 
 32
interests of Germany in his mind and it would be best to split up the various groups and 
national factions in the East.  People belonging to the smallest fractions would become 
mayor and police officers. This would prevent that a larger minority group would be in 
local decision making positions. At the same time, the national spirit of the various 
groups should be eliminated.  Jews should be removed to Africa.  People not belonging 
to the Volksgruppe would leave school after the fourth grade; simple math, such as 
counting to 500 and writing of their names would be tolerated, and reading would not be 
encouraged. Children with Aryan traits could receive schooling and education only in 
Germany, where they would have to change their names, become integrated, and 
would remain. Parents of such children would then have the options of either joining 
their offspring or not having any more children. The Nazis did not want to take a chance 
that a ‘Slavic-gene’ would dominate future children.  A yearly evaluation to detect Aryan 
traits in all six to ten year olds would be conducted. Non-Aryans would become menial 
workers in construction or other hard labor jobs.105 
Meyer-Hetling’s core idea, however, was to restructure the eastern territories, 
economically as well as demographically. More than thirty million inhabitants, 75% of 
the Belorussians, 80% of the Poles, and a little more than half of the Ukrainians would 
be forced to resettle east of the Ural Mountains, while a small percentage would stay 
behind and work as forced laborers in German settlements. The immediate settlement 
areas were Ingermanland (Petersburg area), the Gotenau (Crimea and the Cherson 
region), and Memel-Narew (Bialystock and Western Lithuania). Meyer-Hetling submitted 
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the GPO at a time when the German army had advanced quickly into Russia, and it was 
believed that it would only be a matter of weeks until the Red Army was defeated and 
the new territory would come completely under German control. This first draft also 
included a provision to remove about five million Jews and transfer them to Siberia. 
However, when the revised version of the plan was made public in the spring of 1942, 
the Jews, according to Alfred Rosenberg, would be exterminated. Therefore, no further 
planning for them became necessary. On May 28,1943 a third version of the GPO was 
submitted, and this time it differed in a very important point from the previous ones.  
Meyer-Hetling had realized that because of the war, the group of potential settlers was 
getting smaller and smaller, and his newest proposal made concessions to the number 
of “true” settlers. In the regions furthest away from the Reich, the future Gotenau and 
Ingermanland, only 50% of the settlers had to fulfill the racial as well as the soldierly 
requirements. The numbers of future Űber-peasants sank with every battle lost. 
The Reichskommissariat Ukraine was established on September 1, 1941, 
bordering the Generalgouvernement in the west and the Ostland in the north.106  The 
south followed roughly the Dnjestr and the eastern border stretched almost to the Pripjet 
marshes. Due to continuing fighting, these borders were re-drawn several times, first 
extending further into the eastern part of Europe, and later, with the Red Army 
advancing westwards, shrinking by the week. The last expansion was approved on 
September 1, 1942 when the region around Kiev, the areas around Dnjepropetrowsk, 
Nikolajew, and the Crimea were included. Divided into six general districts 
(Dnjepropetrowsk, Kiev, Crimea, Wolhynia, Nikolajew, and Zhytomyr), and further sub-
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divided into provinces (Kreisgebiete) or so-called oblasts and Unterbezirke called 
rayons, by 1943, the Ukraine had roughly about 6.6 million inhabitants. The last official 
population count from 1926 indicated 47.4% claiming Ukrainian ethnicity, 25.1% 
Russian and 22.8%  
Jewish.107 Erich Koch as Reichkommissar headed the civilian administration and 
reported to Rosenberg as the Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Kurt 
Klemm became Generalkommissar for the Zhytomyr district. All three positions were 
confirmed by the Fűhrer and the function of these men was to represent the interests of 
the Reich in the eastern territories and not vice versa.108 
As head of the planning commission, Professor Meyer-Hetling was also the 
editor of the publication Forschungsdienst (Research Services), which became more 
and more an instrument of the RKFDV.  It was around this time that the “Darré-istic” 
dreams of Neubauern and settlements were buried by Meyer-Hetling. No longer was it 
enough to be son of a peasant; what counted now was a combination of past and 
future, and the overarching idea was the realignment in the eastern parts for the 
strengthening and rearrangement of Germandom.109  Nazi ideology was based on the 
fact that only races with a genetic predisposition to civilization could be civilized; trying 
to civilize lesser races was a waste of time.110  Meyer-Hetling needed to create a 
specific type of settler with three distinctive characteristics or qualities: descent, 
performance, and attitude. The new peasantry of the East had to have shown special 
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traits such as personal actions, operational readiness, and political combativeness 
(persönliche Aktivität, Einsatzbereitschaft, politischen Kämpferschaft), while having 
distinguished themselves with a sound racial pedigree.  Meyer-Hetling believed that any 
settlement in the East would be dead capital (totes Kapital) if it would not contribute to 
the general racial struggle (Volkstumskampf).111 
 
The East had to Lure and Convince People! 
In the January 1943 issue of the Deutsche Agrarpolitik, Meyer-Hetling explained 
that while the center of the eastern movement was still the German peasant, the future 
eastern settlement could only be carried out by the nation as a whole. Because of the 
war and the loss of life, the peasants were no longer able to supply all the settlers to the 
East.  While this group would always have a special status within the Nazi movement, 
Nordic, pure Aryan blood from all walks of life must be attracted to the East. In times 
past, people left their homelands to better themselves, to gain wealth and prosperity. 
Every German, regardless of whether he was from the countryside or the city, would 
now have an equal chance to own land in the East.  However, “Frontkämpfer” who 
fought with their lives for these lands, would receive preferential treatment. Young, fresh 
blood needed to be injected into the peasantry, and the youth from both the cities and 
the countryside would be united. Under the New Agrarian Order, new settlers would 
come from both experienced front-line soldiers and the German youth. The 1942 annual 
slogan of the German Youth titled Eastern Commitment and Agricultural Service was 
announced by Himmler, and he proclaimed that the wide open fields of the East, earned 
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by German blood, were awaiting German youth to settle there as Wehrbauern.112 The 
new lands between Warthe und Weichsel, the Bug and the Dnjepr would give hundreds 
of thousands of peasant sons the opportunity to own pieces of land. Plans were made 
to expand this resettlement effort even further east after the war. 1942 was also the 
year in which Darré retired from his position as head of the food and agriculture 
ministry. Ill health was given as the official reason. Herbert Backe, who officially 
replaced Darré in May 1942, was not only the head of the agricultural section of the 
Four-Year Plan, but possessed superb knowledge of Russian agriculture. His 
dissertation titled Die russische Getreidewirtschaft (The Russian Grain Economy) 
showed inside information on the Russian wheat crop. According to Corni, the 
difference between Darré and his successor Backe was that Darré was greatly 
interested in selecting a new peasant nobility; Backe placed the accent more on 
economic matters.113 Therefore, Corni arrived at the conclusion that Darré’s blood and 
soil ideas conflicted with the economic plans of the Nazis. In Darré’s opinion, a peasant 
always had to consider his activities as a duty towards his family and people and never 
simply as an economic venture.114 
Efficient settlement required good planning, and for this purpose the 
“Arbeitsgemeinschaft fűr Ostsiedlung” (working group for Eastern Settlement) headed 
by SS-Standartenfűhrer Prof Dr. Carstens was founded early in 1942. Other committee 
members included Meyer-Hetling and the vice-chancellor of the University of Posen, 
Walter Geisler, but no member of the Reichsnährstand was invited to serve. The 
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committee primarily focused on the questions of Germanization and settlement.115  With 
a high-ranking SS-officer heading the committee, it was obvious that soldiers, not 
peasants, had moved into the spotlight of the resettlement policies in the East. In this 
equation, the former front-line soldier, who transformed himself under Nazi ideology into 
the Űber-peasant, now became the most important person. Not every veteran was 
made for this assignment. “Es muss schon ein ganzer Kerl sein. Deutsch bis zum Kern, 
stolz, und seiner deutschen Verpflichtung bewußt”(He must be a complete man: 
German down to his core and conscious of his German obligations). This new type of 
settler could and should not be afraid to work, but had to be ready for action every day 
as a soldier, and it was hoped that the longer this settler would live on his new lands, 
the more he would learn and love his new homeland. “Soldierly spirit of the German 
nation, its pleasure and joy of discipline; order is feared, but also admired by her 
enemies.”116 By receiving land in the East, the veteran would not only become a 
peasant but a frontier-guard. After 1943, the requirements of becoming a career soldier 
highlighted a variety of good prospects, including the future settlement possibilities in 
the East.117 
The specific qualifications, which differed very little from the original RNS 
requirements, were listed in the Hoheitsträger as the Neubauernschein (New-peasant 
certificate), included a specialized knowledge in the area of agriculture.118 Applicants 
born after 1915 who lacked this knowledge were expected to gain experience through a 
                                                 
115 “Arbeitsgemeinschaft”, OB, Jan 20, 1942. 
116 Heinrich Hoffmann. Deutscher Osten, Land der Zukunft (Műnchen: Hoffmann Verlag,1942), 
65. 
117 “Wie werde ich Berufssoldat?”, OB, Jan 1, 1943. 
118 For a copy of a Neubauernschein see “Siedlungs-Vertrag #3041” in the appendix. 
 38
two-year apprenticeship following an exam. Older applicants could substitute the 
apprenticeship with continuing education courses. Political reliability, racial soundness 
determined through an examination by the local health department, a minimum age of 
25 (maximum 55), and being married or engaged to a woman who was able to fulfill the 
same requirements was necessary. The application for the Neubauernschein would still 
be handled through the RNS and remain in their offices until a suitable farm was found. 
With this step, the RNS was reduced to handling the administrative component of the 
process. No funds to purchase the land were required. Additional information necessary 
for the eastern settlement included a resume, school transcripts, records of any 
agricultural education, report cards from children, birth and marriage certificates 
(including the ones from applicant’s parents and grandparents), two passport photos, 
and two wedding pictures.119The Baltic German, Karl Freiherr v. Manteuffel, went one 
step further when he proposed that not only could the future Erbhöfe in the East be 
bigger than previously planned under Darré’s scheme (“wir műssen mit dem Acker nicht 
geizen”, we don’t have to be stingy with the land), but he also wanted to include persons 
who performed exceptional service for the Reich in the area of politics or business. In 
his opinion, it was not necessary for the future peasant to possess agricultural 
knowledge.120 By leaving the administrative part of the application process with the RNS 
but the requirements with the RKFDV, it seemed that Darré’s ministry was still in 
charge.  Himmler issued a general directive number 14/V (Allgemeine Anordnung) on 
August 18, 1942 about the preferential settlement of disabled veterans and fighters for 
the national cause (Freikorps as well as Spanish Civil War veterans) in the eastern 
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territories. Persons belonging to these groups had the option of becoming peasants in 
the occupied eastern territories, Lower Styria, Upper Carniola, and Alsace-West 
Lorraine. To ease the settlement process, peasants would receive a completely 
equipped farm with inventory and harvest.  However, non-party members as well as 
civilians, including peasants, needed an unobjectionable declaration or 
Unbedenklichkeits-Erklärung.121Just prior to this announcement, Himmler had stopped 
all settlement applications from German peasants to the East in favor of the front-
soldiers still engaged in battle reinforcing v. Manteuffel’s stand. To make good on their 
promises, sixty disabled war veterans were settled by May of 1943 in the Wartheland by 
the SS.122 By November of that year, a total of 120 veterans had received their new 
farms.123 
However, the RNS still “advertised” the East as a settlement region for all 
German peasants.  Furthermore, they now ignored the former front soldiers as possible 
candidates altogether. In an article titled “Wer kann Neubauer werden?” (Who can 
become a new peasant?), the only acceptable candidates for the RNS were peasants, 
pointing out the failure of the settlements before 1933. Although the RKFVD was not 
addressed directly, it was implied that settling any other group but peasants would have 
been seen as a mistake, by saying “damals konnte jeder siedeln” (back then everyone 
could settle).124 The idea of resettling Reich peasants was still alive and pursued by the 
RNS even in 1942 after Germany’s military had suffered high casualties. Herbert Backe 
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stressed the concept of putting peasant blood in the new spaces and by doing so, 
farmland in the Reich would become available for modernization and increased 
productivity.125 Rudi Peukert, NSDAP-Chief of Staff for Agriculture and Politics admitted 
that the topic of peasant settlement had taken many paths in the past, but in the end, 
the pendulum would swing back to the original Darré idea of blood and soil because 
only German peasants were qualified to preserve the eastern living space.126  Hans-
Joachim Riecke, State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
continued by advocating the mobilization of Reich peasants as late as the summer of 
1943.127 The same year, the Reichsnährstandverlag published the book “Bauerntum” by 
Johann von Leers in which he noted that the large eastern areas, although won by the 
heroic efforts of the military, could only be truly settled with German 
peasants.128Jungbauern (junior peasants) should think about the possibility of settling 
autonomously in the East.129 
Besides the opportunity for peasants to settle, skilled craftspeople also were 
welcomed in the Eastern territories. The positive developments in the East would 
produce great and attractive areas of operation like never before in German history.130 It 
was estimated that there were openings for about 60,000 “Handwerker” (craftsmen) 
who could either take over existing shops or build their own, while at the same time 
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acting as pioneers in their fields. The master craftsman exam was desired for those who 
applied, but not necessary; however, it had to be obtained within three years.131 A 
“Reichsdeutscher” master craftsman, based out of the same office as the 
Gebietskommissar, would advise the newly settled trades people. Applications were 
accepted at every Chamber of Commerce in the Reich.132A craftsman had to fulfill the 
same racial requirements as the peasants.133 In the spring of 1942, Germans prided 
themselves on the rebuilding of the Ukrainian trade and crafts economy.134 Since the 
administration of these new villages would be mostly run on a voluntary basis, few civil 
servants were needed. Not to exclude this group from the opportunities in the East 
though, settlements mostly restricted to single-family houses were also planned in the 
Generalgovernement.135  
Disagreements about who was in charge, when, and why extended far beyond 
the Nazi leadership. Once Germany started occupying territories in the East, companies 
or new associations sprang up all over Germany, mostly hiding behind colonial names 
or logos, but all with one goal in mind:  to exploit the eastern territories. One of these 
was a governmental agency for colonial economic affairs which was founded in Bremen 
with the purpose of market analysis on the export and imports with the Reich.136 The 
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Reichskommissar for the Ostland, Hinrich Lohse137, announced the establishment of a 
trust company (Treuhandverwaltung fűr das Ostland) to administer confiscated 
capital.138 New companies, such as the Zentrale Handelsgesellschaft Ost fűr 
landwirtschaftlichen Absatz und Bedarf m.b.H. (ZO), the GW-Osteinsatz Gmbh, the 
Gruppe Teepflanzer, the Pflanzen Kautschuk-Forschungsgesellschaft m.b.H., the 
Tabak Gesellschaft Kaukasus, and the Tabak-Anbau Gmbh, as well as the 
Versorgungswerk Ukraine Gmbh (Central Trading Company East for Agricultural 
Distribution and Demand, Tea-grower Organization, Rubber Research Association, 
Tobacco Association Caucasus, Public Utilities of the Ukraine), and the insurance 
agency VAL , registered in 1942 in Berlin with the sole purpose of doing business in the 
occupied eastern territories. For instance, Kautschuk or natural rubber, was an 
important raw material in war production.  The Reichskommissar issued a data-sheet on 
how to detect, collect, secure, and store the plants as well as report any findings to the 
Plenipotentiary for Motor Vehicles in Berlin.139Tobacco farmers from the Reich were 
transferred to the Ukraine to help with the harvests on the almost 98,000 acres set 
aside for this crop.140 
A confidential report by the German Colonial Economic Association issued on 
January 30, 1943 underlined the work in the new cotton research center in Cherson, as 
well as a special report by Sonderfűhrer Meyer Hetling about peanut farming in the 
southern Ukraine and the possibility of sesame cultivation. Both were viewed as future 
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fat providers for the Reich.141 However, just five months later, agriculture in the Ukraine 
was in trouble.  Due to a mild, dry winter, concerns were raised about the upcoming 
crop season, and it was suspected that the 1943 harvest would not fulfill German 
expectations.142 In order not to alarm the general public about these problems, 
magazines and journals were filled with misleading stories about the rich harvests, and 
pictures showed warehouses in the East full of wheat and cereals, fields filled with crop 
ready to be harvested, or shelves full of cheese.143 The July issue of the Deutsche 
Agrarpolitik ran a report on agriculture in the frontline showing images such as a herd of 
fat hogs grazing on wide open fields, potato fields, and how German technology in 
agriculture increased output.144 However, it was not just the image of the East portrayed 
in German Wochenschau movies that concerned the Nazis. A memo dated April 9, 
1943 showed that the occupation costs for the Ukraine from June to December 1942 
were 640 million RM.145In 1943, only 1.7% of all products imported into the Reich 
originated in the Ukraine; the share of food was even lower than this, running at 0.9%. 
Only 0.9% of all raw materials imported into the Reich came from the Ukraine.  
Altogether, during this time, the Reich imported roughly 43.8 million tons of goods, 
including food products from the Ukraine. 146 
                                                 
141 T-71, RWM, reel 100, frame 6001203 
142 T-71, reel 66, frame 564685. 
143 See picture series: Landwirtschaftsfűhrer im Einsatz, Deutsche Agrarpolitik, Jan/Feb 1944. 
144 Deutsche Agrarpolitik, July 1943. 
145 Table from Deutsche Reichsbank, Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung, Berlin, April 1943; T-71, 
RWM, 16/124, reel 60, frame 557678. 
146 Deutscher Aussenhandel 1943, Reiner Warenverkehr;T-71, RWM, reel 99, frame 600307. 
 44
CHAPTER 5 
HEGEWALD: HIMMLER’S UTOPIAN SETTLEMENT 
 
The German colonist ought to live on handsome, spacious farms. 
        Hitler, Table Talks  
 
Hitler’s plans for eastern settlements included small cities, surrounded by 
handsome villages, and connected by roads. While medieval villages in Germany had 
developed around families and kinships, this future village in the East would be carefully 
planned, with the strong concept of volksgemein-schaftlicher Verbundenheit 
(communitarian solidarity).147 Since a village was seen as the first political core of the 
new Volksgemeinschaft in the East, it was important to break with the previously known 
landscape. Villages in the Reich were perceived as weak since they directly competed 
with cities. By not repeating mistakes from the Reich, there would now be a “main” 
village with amenities such as a school, bank, dairy, medical facility, and maybe even a 
movie theater.148 These villages would maintain an independent existence with a 
voluntary (ehrenamtliche) administration. No more than 300-400 people would live in 
these planned communities. Buildings would not be “clumped” close together as in the 
old Haufendorf  form or stretched as in a Strassendorf form. In these oftentimes several 
miles long village types, properties were no wider than towels or suspenders.149 There 
was little interaction between neighbors on either end of the village and community 
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gathering places were non-existent.  Rundling and Angerdorf forms were 
recommended.150 A traveling exhibition under the heading “Dorf und Hof im neuen 
Osten” (village and farm in the new East) detailed future settlements, blueprints, maps, 
models, and pictures.151 
 
Figure 2.  Heinrich Himmler details his plans for the new settlements in 1941 to Rudolf Heß152 
 
 However, these plans conflicted again with Darré’s original ideas of moving 
entire villages from the old Reich into the East. Under the SS scheme, the existing 
tundra or veldt would be integrated into the whole equation.153 Therefore, it made no 
sense to the planners in Berlin to plough and grow on arid land and receive very little in 
return as under the Soviet system.  Under the new order, the dry, barren and treeless 
landscape would be completely changed: forests would be planted, dams would be built 
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to collect the melting snow waters in the spring and “the East will become a paradise of 
fertility.”154 Through timed fertilization, clearance of ravines, and weed control, even 
small farms could run efficiently.155 Germany called the reforestation of the East the 
world’s largest undertaking.156Almost four million square miles of new forest was 
planned over a twenty-five year period since the Ukraine was one of the most sparsely 
wooded areas on earth.157 In 1943, Germans operated 317 tree nurseries, growing both 
fruit trees as well as timber.158 Certain parts of the Ukraine, especially the South and the 
Crimea, would become an exclusive German colony, populated only by Hitler’s Űber-
peasants:  peasant soldiers who had been professional, front-line fighters with at least 
twelve years of duty.  Former soldiers, who were also sons of peasants, would receive a 
completely equipped farm from the Reich with only one stipulation attached, that they 
were to marry Aryan women of peasant stock. Furthermore, these former soldiers would 
act as the local school teachers to educate Germany’s future elite.159 To accustom the 
Germans to the wide open spaces of the East, trips from Germany would be arranged 
by the government.  While the future railways were exclusively used for the 
transportation of goods, visitors would travel on new roads.160 These roads would be 
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studded with German towns, and around these towns, colonists would settle.161 The 
East would be transformed by the Germans into a country in which humans would be 
able to live, implying that the region in February 1942 was still uninhabitable, and the 
people living there were not humans.162  Refineries were not planned in the East with 
the exceptions of keeping open existing plants in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The 
East was only to supply raw materials to the Reich and would maintain its rural, 
agricultural character.163  
 
The “New” German East 
The Hitler directive from October 7, 1939 named Heinrich Himmler the head of 
the Reichskommissariat for the Strengthening of Germandom. “Germanization,” as 
interpreted by the International Military Tribunal procedures, meant to assimilate those 
territories politically, culturally, socially and economically into the German Reich, and 
abrogate the rights of the local population, reserving this area for exclusive settlement, 
development, and ownership by Germans.164 The operational staff of the RKFDV was 
not a new organization, but instead had been camouflaged as a development of the 
Leitstelle fűr Ein und-Rűckwanderung (Office of Immigration and Returning Emigrants) 
and incorporated into Himmler’s personal staff. Its main functions were planning and 
preparing proposals, handling loss compensation, procurement, central real estate, and 
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resettlement.165 The Baltic German, Alfred Rosenberg, was nominated on July 17, 1941 
to become Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, but Hitler circumvented 
Rosenberg and his Ostministerium’s (OMi) powers at the same time by putting 
Hermann Göring in charge of economic matters and making Himmler responsible for 
security. With this decision, in addition to the Koch nomination to Reichskommissar for 
the Ukraine, he contributed to the notorious arguments and power struggles that 
plagued the Nazi administration. Rosenberg, after receiving his new assignment, issued 
a memo to the Foreign Ministry as well as other ministries and departments, instructing 
them that “all publications planned in matters of the eastern areas, also all directives 
and orders…. are to be submitted to him for his opinion and approval.”166 Throughout 
the war, frictions between the different ministries existed.167 It seemed to Corni that the 
demise of Darré was not, as some historians put it, due to the fact that he was not a true 
National Socialist, but rather to the polycentric, chaotic policy-making process in the 
regime.168 In public, Rosenberg’s OMi, nicknamed Cha-Ostministerium, had to compete 
for recognition and resources with other government and semi-private organizations. 
While Rosenberg agreed to keep planning as well as the execution of 
resettlements with Meyer-Hetling in the SS, in July of 1942, he was pushing for 
immediate, concrete resettlement policies. It did not matter to him who was in charge as 
long as someone was pushing the issue (“die Hauptsache sei, dass etwas geschieht, 
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durch wen es geschieht wäre eine Frage zweiter Ordnung”).169 Several documents 
introduced during the Nuremberg Trials detailed the power struggle between the 
ministries in Berlin, but also the dislike on very personal levels. For example, Erich 
Koch, Reichskommissar for the Ukraine, complained to his boss, Rosenberg that the 
various ordinances issued by his (Rosenberg’s) ministry criticized him personally.170 In 
other “battles” with him, Koch, as an Alte Kämpfer, had direct access to Hitler; he closed 
schools when Rosenberg ordered them to open and made speeches rejecting any and 
all plans for even modest autonomy for the Ukraine.171 
The conflicts lingered into 1943 and the dispute over the eastern territories was 
not resolved; Rosenberg was still insisting that his OMi was in charge since  
“Gesamterschliessung umfasst politische, landwirtschaftliche, wirtschaftliche, 
technische und völkische Probleme die nur von einer zentralen Stelle aus űberblickt 
werden können” (the overall development included political, agricultural, economical, 
technical, and national problems which could only be supervised from one central 
office).172 On the day of his nomination, Himmler had released a decree for the purpose 
of obtaining land for ethnic German settlers (Landbeschaffung zur Seßhaftmachung), 
and at the same time putting the RKFDV in charge, even though Rosenberg was head 
of the Siedlungsausschuss (settlement committee).173 Under the Himmler directive, the 
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heads of the individual departments or their deputies were allowed to acquire land for 
the purpose of moving and resettling people. 
Himmler, who always considered himself a peasant first and soldier second, 
countered some of Darré’s original terminology of “Ackernahrung” by introducing terms 
like “Hufe” for the size of eastern farms.174 He believed that a Hufe-size farm was 
adequate for one family, but should vary from region to region. In the East, the size 
would be determined on political grounds, but would more likely be between 60 and 100 
acres. The further east the settlement, however, the larger the farm would be.175 
Doppel-Hufe and Gross-Hufe farms would also be constructed, covering more than 620 
acres.176 Who would own these large estates was left in the dark. However, in a letter 
from December 17, 1942, SS-Gruppenfűhrer Gottlob Berger complained to Himmler 
that Rosenberg’s OMi issued deed certificates (Landverteilungsurkunden) to deserving 
persons without prior approval of the SS.  These deeds bore a facsimile signature from 
either Göring or Keitel.177 In February of the following year, Josef Goebbels issued a 
secret memorandum explaining the treatment of European people in the East.  In it, he 
warned not to talk about the planned German settlements or taking land away under 
eminent domain.178 All of these transformations and ideas would take time to implement 
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and to complete. In October of 1942, during a fiery speech at the Odeonsplatz, 
Goebbels warned that the space which the soldiers conquered must be given a “Form,” 
must be organized, and be made useful.179 
In 1941, the government ran an architectural contest in the Reich titled: 
Schaffung neuer Dörfer im Oste (Creating new villages in the East). Architects and 
planners could submit their visions of the “New East,” taking the goal of an organic 
connection to Hof zum Acker (farm to land) into account. The size of a single village 
would be approximately 2500-3000 acres, giving each family between 50 and 100 acres 
of land. Eight to ten of these small villages would then form a larger, main village with 
roughly about 800-1000 people, with not more than one hour or five kilometers’ walking 
distance between them. These village formations would then be grouped around a small 
town with not more than 10-20,000 inhabitants and none of the smaller villages would 
be more than twenty km away from the towns. Each village would have a community 
center, NSDAP house, health facility, day-care center, restaurant, marching and parade 
ground, a bell tower, and a sports complex, as well as warehouses and storage 
facilities. So-called Trutzhöfe, acting as meeting and gathering places, would emerge in 
each village. The name Trutzhof can be translated into a farmstead which “braves the 
elements” and is “defying the odds,” and these farms would be built in a classic Nordic 
style.180 In the larger main village, one would find a gas station, barbershops, bakery, 
physician, dentist and vet, six married teachers and two unmarried teachers, as well as 
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a few other stores.181 Specialized stores, craftsmen, the movie theater, and the 
Gymnasium would be found only in the towns. These small towns would also be built up 
like garrisons.182  
Due to the war, however, many if not all of these contests and visions had to be 
altered or modified and ultimately dropped. For instance, it became necessary to 
construct or repair farms now with clay instead of the desired wood and brick. These 
traditional building materials were either unavailable or too expensive to ship east.183  
Dr. Josef Goebbels wrote in his introduction to the booklet “Deutscher Osten, 
Land der Zukunft” (German East, Land of the Future) that amber waves of wheat were 
growing in the fields, providing bread for the nation.  However, he vehemently rejected 
the notion that the East was the dumping ground for failed party officials or disgruntled 
army officers, the so-called Ostnieten, new economic theories or involuntary transfer of 
bureaucrats. Strong Aryan peasants would vigilantly guard the eastern border, ready 
with their swords and ploughs to keep the peace in a rich Germanic culture. Goebbels 
suggested that every young man should consider it an honor to serve at least a few 
years in the East.  The East, as he put it, was no longer a yearning, but a fulfillment of 
the German nation. The SS-training manual Bauerntum educated the reader on the 
difference between living in the East and the West. “We can not use people in the East, 
who only come here to enrich their wealth and then want to move back to Germany, no 
we need German people who are happily securing the new German east.”184New 
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settlers would not just “go to the colonies,” but would be sent by the government or 
other agencies.  This would not only eliminate adventurous types, but also give the 
government and Party the opportunity to look at the racial background of the 
applicant.185 The public, on the other hand, still believed in the settlement opportunities 
in the East.   Newspapers ran personal ads by people looking for mates who would 
build a future together with them in the East; women wanted to leave the Reich because 
their husbands were stationed in the East, and others followed the call to duty to find a 
significant other.186 
Germany was not the only nation expected to settle the newly claimed East. 
Other “Aryan” nations like the Danes, Swedes or Dutch were also welcomed. The new 
living space would become the meeting place for all capable and energetic men of 
Europe.187 The Dutch, especially, were embraced because of a variety of factors. They 
not only had direct access to the Atlantic via the North Sea, were experienced 
colonizers, but had established trade ties to the Far East. The Nazi Party had created 
close ties to the National Socialist Movement in Holland and the first Dutch artisan 
settlement was established in Posen in November 1941.188 Rost van Tonningen, CEO 
of the Nederlandische Oost Companie (NCO) or Dutch East Company, an overzealous 
Dutch Nazi, took several trips to Zhytomyr, Kiev, and Berlin to discuss the 
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administration of large estates in the Ukraine by Dutch farmers in 1942.189 A few 
months later, the NOC took over the administration of two large estates in Sskwira and 
Usin, both over 2500 acres in size.190 Some historians considered the newest Dutch 
undertaking actually their fourth time of trying to get a foothold in the East.191 
Himmler’s goal was to fulfill Hitler’s promise to bring the ethnic Germans back 
into the Reich, but more importantly to implement a redesign of the newly- integrated 
areas and all future areas to come in the East.  The basic idea of Nazi ideology, that all 
politics only entail race and nation (Rasse-und Volkspolitik) moved now into the center 
of the expansion efforts in the East.  This would be one of the greatest resettlement 
efforts of all time. However, party lines were divided on the subject.  For years, Darré 
and his agricultural ministry had promoted the idea of a strong German peasantry in the 
East based on his Blut und Boden ideology. However, with Heinrich Himmler and the 
SS in charge of the eastern territories, new guidelines appeared which were often in 
stark contrast to Darré’s philosophy. Darré’s vision of the East entailed many, but 
smaller settlements.192 
Herbert Backe noted in the preface of his journal Deutsche Agrarpolitik that for 
centuries the plow of the German peasant had conquered the East.193  Since there was 
supposedly no land available in Germany (Landnot), peasant families were forced to 
move eastward, acting as pioneers, taming the land, and bringing culture to the regions 
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and acting as mentors to the Slavs. Because of these heroic acts by Germans, the East 
was now considered the Kornkammer or bread basket of Europe. The fight against 
Bolshevism made it clear again that “freies und wehrhaftes Bauerntum” were identical 
terms.  Therefore, the German peasant in the East was always considered a 
Wehrbauer.194Around 1942, it became clear that the term “internal settlement” or 
colonization was inappropriate since the previous forms of settlement could not be 
applied to the East.  The new settlements needed to have their own requirements 
according to the new demands. Since the settlers were now in new territories and living 
under different conditions far from the homeland, the settlers needed reliable help. In 
none of the writings was the help clearly defined, but it was implied that the SS as well 
as the Party would play a great role.195 
 
Infrastructure and Agriculture in the Ukraine 
When the Wehrmacht crossed the border into the Ukraine, they moved into a 
region that bordered the Black Sea and Sea of Azov in the south, and in the north a 
region with few forests. However, swamps and marshes, nestled between Romania, 
Poland and Byelorussia. The Ukraine, a republic of the USSR since 1922, was roughly 
about 3.6 million square miles, but the region had been larger before 1918. At this time 
it had included territories east of Poland, including Wolhynia, Lemberg, Krakow and 
Bialystok. In 1941, 83% of the land was used for agriculture.196  In the view of German 
planners, this region, particularly in the south, had a good transportation system since 
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most rivers emptied into the Black Sea with further connections to the Mediterranean. 
Through the rivers Dnjepr and Bug and many smaller canals and lakes, the region was 
connected to the Baltic Sea and the relatively flat landscape did not exceed 650 feet in 
height. The Dnjepr, Europe’s second largest river system and at some locations up to 
1900 feet wide, was strategically important to the Germans.197 The climate was 
considered “Pontisc,” a more temperate, marine climate:  dry but warm with an average 
temperature of 50°F, with Yalta slightly higher at 60°F and a July average of 68°F. 
Fertile Schwarzerde soil (black humus soil) and other mineral resources (coal, oil, gas, 
peat, iron ore, salt, potash and phosphor) were found throughout.198 However, German 
scientists were looking into ways to influence and control the climate in the Ukraine. For 
example, it was considered that by adding sand to existing heavy wet soil, heat would 
then be transferred faster to the root system of plants.199 The SS had also established a 
Sammelkommando (collection squad) under the command of Untersturmfűhrer Heinz 
Brűcher for the sole purpose of gathering native plants and seeds.200 The existing 
Russian railroad system was poor in comparison to German standards; it not only used 
unfamiliar technology, but was outdated and inadequately maintained. Difficulties 
ranged from reading the Cyrillic letters identifying the trains to destroyed tracks. Since 
one of the goals of the Nazis was to exploit the natural resources for the benefit of the 
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Reich, a sound working rail system was crucial, and by the fall of 1942, trains were 
rolling toward the Reich.201 
The agricultural system in the Soviet Union differed also from that of the Reich. 
The sovkhoz was a state farm, completely organized by the state.  The agricultural 
workers were paid salaries by the state. In comparison, the mostly smaller kolkhoz 
farms, while also under state rule, paid their workers a share of the farm products. A 
kolkhoz peasant was allowed to own one cow and pig and little more than an acre of 
land for his family to farm.202 In 1939, the areas later occupied by Germany had 
contained 57,000 kolkhozes with 6.3 million horses, 16.4 million cows and 14.8 million 
pigs, although in some areas all livestock had disappeared. 203 Siegfried Medrow, from 
the Reichsministry for Food and Agriculture, noted that while peasant cooperatives in 
the past had worked well in the Reich, their existence no longer could be applied in the 
East.204 He asked for the foundation of a “besonders Traegerinstitut” (special agency) 
that would assist with technical matters in constructing the new villages. When the 
Nazis looked at the importance of production efficiency vs. “völkisch” mentality, the later 
was always seen as more important.205 Both the sovkhoz and the kolkhoz systems were 
hated by the Russian peasants, and Rosenberg found it necessary to announce a “new 
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agrarian” order for the occupied eastern territories.206 Propaganda pamphlets and 
newspapers called the kolkhoz system “Fabriken zur Unterdrűckung des freien 
Bauerntums” (factories to oppress the free peasants).207 Dr. Otto Schiller, who was the 
agrarian advisor for IG-Farben and later professor in Hohenheim, wrote after the war 
that the shortage of equipment and qualifications, or complete lack thereof, of kolkhoz 
farmers for an immediate shift to individual management made it impossible to replace 
the collective system with individually-operated family farms. The system was replaced 
by a new one of farm management which Schiller called “farming co-operative.”208 A 
pro-active German peasant was be the goal in the future, but until then, the kolkhoz 
system would remain. In addition, Germany would build up co-operatives in the East, 
contradicting the agrarian side represented by Medrow. Under the co-op system, soil 
would be worked together and each peasant would receive tax-free land for his own 
benefit.209 The rebuilding of agriculture was handled by the Landwirtschaftsfűhrer or 
district agricultural leader, (LWF) who were mainly recruited from the ranks of 
“reichsdeutsche Bauern und Landwirte” (German peasants and big farmers), civil 
servants, and sometimes ethnic German peasants. Their responsibilities were to 
inventory the assets and crops in the regions.  It was expected that they would 
overcome any difficulties and make decisions independently and on the spot. The LWFs 
were on the payroll of Göring and his Four-Year Plan, not Darrė, Backe, or Rosenberg.  
                                                 
206 “Neue Agrarordnung im besetzten Osten”, OB, Feb 28, 1942; T-175, reel 17, frame 2520093ff. 
207 “Kolchosen und Sowchosen”, OB, Feb 28, 1942. 
208 Otto Schiller. The farming Co-operative. Land Economics. University of Wisconsin, vol xxvii, 1, 
Feb 1951, 2. 
209 “Freie Bauern im Kaukasus”, OB, Jan 9, 1943. Die neue Agrarordnung, T-175, reel 17, frame 
2520093. 
 59
It was proposed that all Neubauerndörfer should be run as universal agricultural 
co-operatives.210 It appeared that the “New Agrarian Order” was more effective than its 
predecessor.  Reports from the Heeresgruppe Mitte indicated that peasants made a 
greater commitment now toward their fields than under the Soviet collective system.211 
However, signs of the war could be seen everywhere, weed instead of wheat, meager 
livestock looking for food, but  the deep, rich, black soil was waiting to support wide 
areas of Europe.212 Berlin believed that this was just temporary and the Ukraine was in 
a transition period, which, under German direction, would turn into the promised 
Kornkammer.213 Dr. Karl Stumpp, appointed by Rosenberg to handle ethnic questions, 
traveled the Ukraine extensively in 1941 and 1942. In his third report, dated September 
30, 1941, Stumpp said that he was impressed with the fruit orchards around Zhytomyr. 
He believed that with good planning, the unused slopes in the countryside could be 
transformed into orchards and planted.214 Although by September 1942 German troops 
had advanced all the way into the Caucasus, the promised raw materials, food and 
other riches had not materialized. The Völkischer Beobachter tried to explain away the 
failure blaming Bolshevik lies about the economic development before German 
occupation.215 A study compiled by the SS specified that Ukrainian agriculture was 
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dependent on the oilfields in the Caucasus. Without fuel, it would be impossible to 
deliver the expected yearly crop of cereal to Germany.216 
 
“The Happiest Day of my Life,” Himmler and his Hegewald 
Himmler considered 16 July 1942 “the happiest day of his life.”  He had 
previously spoken to Hitler and everything he had considered and planned on a small 
scale could now be realized.217 Peasants again would become Germany’s everlasting 
fountain of youth, and villages inhabited by an armed peasantry would form the basis of 
settlements in the East.218 The Zhytomyr region where Himmler’s Hegewald was 
located was about ninety miles to the west of Kiev and on the Narew River. The Nazis 
created the Zhytomyr general district from parts of the Vinitsa and the Kiev regions.  As 
Wendy Lower described it, this region became the hub of elite activities in the Ukraine 
and a laboratory for Heinrich Himmler’s resettlement activities.219 Both Hitler with his 
secret headquarters Werwolf and Himmler with his Hegewald compound maintained 
bases in the Ukraine. The actual “village” of Hegewald, just southwest of Zhytomyr, was 
a group of settlements and was a fully functioning community by September 1942.220 
Hegewald was not just a single village or settlement; it was part of a larger group of 
master planned communities and symbolized the other planned localities. Racially 
selected ethnic Germans were the first to resettle around the headquarters, and once 
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Hegewald reached its full population capacity, it was declared an ethnic German district, 
to be governed not by Rosenberg’s commissars but by Himmler’s SS.221 In order to 
accomplish this, the 486 settlements in the area were consolidated into 100 villages 
around Hegewald.222 Meyer-Hetling was put in charge of merging existing settlements 
in and around Hegewald.223 In the general district of Zhytomyr, the area commissariats 
were combined and the compound and its twenty-eight surrounding settlements were 
declared a distinct administration unit.224 Kurt Klemm became Regierungspräsident, 
Drs. Zagel and Knust Landräte (county commissioners) and the position of 
Gebietskommissar (regional commissar) Zhytomyr was given to Regierungsrat Kamm. 
All civil service appointments as well as administrative positions had to be approved by 
the Reichskommissar, Division 1.225 In the “old” Reich, the SS competed with traditions 
of a powerful and proud bureaucracy. In the Ukraine, there was, as Steinberg put it, “an 
administrative vacuum.”226 It was understood that the Reich inheritance law was to be 
applied to all eastern settlements.227 Himmler spoke of villages of thirty to forty farms, 
each farm with roughly 300 acres of land, and with the above-mentioned Party and 
meeting facilities, he wanted, at least for the East, to achieve the complete fusion of 
Party and State.228  
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With these moves, Himmler placed himself at the forefront of the Blood and Soil 
movement; Hegewald became “his” colony.229 Yet, on November 12, 1943, with Red 
Army soldiers nearby, Himmler’s Hegewald and the military base were burned down by 
the SS.230 No German peasant family ever lived in Hegewald. 
                                                 
229 Lower, Nazi Empire-Building, 172. 







 Race, Culture, and a Nation can only exist if they are anchored in the Soil. 
      Brekenfeld, Wehrkraft und Siedlung 
 
 
 Not only did the SS have interests in the settlement and therefore Germanization 
of the East, but Rosenberg’s OMi and Darré’s agricultural ministry were also actively 
working toward settlement policies in that area. This thesis has focused on Richard 
Walther Darré, Heinrich Himmler, and to a lesser extent, on Alfred Rosenberg. 
Himmler’s subordinate, Konrad Meyer-Hetling, is also highlighted. Serious differences of 
opinion about how the East should be restructured existed among these men.  
The goal of this study was to illustrate the settlement plans of German peasants 
in the conquered eastern living space using the example of Hegewald, and to show how 
these settlement policies shifted from Darré’s original blood and soil ideology to 
Himmler’s SS Űber-Peasants concept. It also showed the often times chaotic decision 
that were made, the lack of coordination among the ministries involved, but more 
important the personal creed and ambition of men in power. In order to accomplish this, 
several topics were addressed. According to Himmler, it was impossible to “become” a 
German; one had to be born of German blood. Monkeys could be trained to do tricks, 
but feelings of belonging can never be taught. Therefore, only Germans could settle in 
the East since they were the only race which truly understood the responsibility “of that 
burden.” The space also had to be secured, not only through the sword, but also 
through the plow. “Wir haben den besten Soldaten der Welt, der im Osten deutschen 
Boden zurűck erobert hat, und es keine Aufgabe die wichtiger wäre als den besten 
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Kolonisten der Welt zu erziehen der fűr alle Zeiten diesen Raum deutschen Volkstums 
sichert (We have the best soldier in the world who re-conquered German soil in the 
East. There is no bigger responsibility than educating this colonist to be the best on 
earth and to secure the living space for all times to come).231 With these words, 
Theodore Oberländer, who later became minister of Displaced Persons and Refugee 
Affairs under Konrad Adenauer, concluded his essay in the Deutsche Monatshefte. He 
certainly echoed Heinrich Himmler’s idea of settling former soldiers, equipped with 
helmets, guns and plows, in the East, and not pure peasants as originally advocated by 
Darré.  With the settlement policies of German peasants in the East, the Nazis 
abandoned previous colonial settlement ideas. Under traditional colonial policies, 
settlers moved into an acquired territory and the occupier lived either among or in close 
proximity to the native people. This traditional concept was not followed by the Nazis in 
the eastern territories occupied during World War II. The native population was either 
moved or annihilated, and it was planned to settle these regions with a selected racial 
population. Himmler and the RKFDV denied the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, first 
Darré and later Backe any participation in the settlement of German peasants in the 
occupied territories. 
In the early years of Nazi rule, Richard Walther Darré had proposed the building 
of a peasant nobility that would understand hard work and the concept of being one with 
the soil. His theories were appealing and sounded good, but as soon as the Nazis 
occupied large parts of Eastern Europe, other, more selfish plans came into place. The 
East was seen as a big cake, and every minister in the Reich, as well as private and 
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other government entities, wanted not only the biggest slice, but also wanted to be the 
first one “to cut the cake.” Himmler and his RKFVD saw a great opportunity to expand 
their power by demonstrating the core racial project of the Nazis. Himmler repeatedly 
stressed the fact that he was not a soldier but a peasant first.  Darré, the peasant 
ideologist, but never the politician, was eventually replaced by Herbert Backe, someone 
with much less influence and more modest ambitions.   By the end of 1943, with the 
advance of the Red Army, all dreams and aspirations of settlements in the East burst 
like a bubble.   





AA  Auswärtiges Amt, Foreign Ministry 
 
DAF  Deutsche Arbeitsfront, German Labor Front 
 
DAI  Deutsches Auslands-Institute, German Foreign Institute 
 
DUT  Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhand-Gessellschaft m.b.H. in Berlin 
  German Resettlement Trust Company 
 
DVL  Deutsche Volksliste, German National List 
 
GG  Generalgouvernement, part of Nazi occupied Poland 
 
GPO  Generalplan Ost  
 
HTO  Haupttreuhandstelle Ost, Main Trust Office East 
   
LBGU Landwirtschaftungsgesellschaft, Agriculture Association 
 
LVL  Landwirtschaftliche Vertrauensleute, Agriculture Ombudsman 
 
LGF  Landwirtschaftlichen Gaufachberater, Agriculture Territory Advisor 
 
LBF  Landesbauernfűhrer, District/Regional Peasant Leader 
 
LWF  Landwirtschaftsfűhrer, District Agricultural Leader 
 
NCO  Nederlandische Oost Companie, Dutch East Company 
 
NSF  Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft (Nazi Women’s Group) 
 
NSV  Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt, NS-Welfare Agency 
 
Oblast  Russian term for Administrative Province 
 
OKW  Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Army High Command 
 
OMi  Ostministerium, Ministry of the East 
 
OVF Ostinstitute fűr Volksbildung und Freizeitgestaltung (Eastern Institute for 
National Education and Recreation 
 
RAD  Reichsarbeitsdienst, National Labor Service 
 
Rayon  Russian term for Administrative District 
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RBF  Reichsbauernfűhrer, Reich Peasant Leader 
 
RKFDV Reichskommissariat fűr die Festigung des Deutschen Volkstums, Reich 
Commission for the Strengthening for Germandom 
 
RKU Reichskommissariat Ukraine, Reich Commissariat Ukraine 
 
RMEuL Reichsminister fűr Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, Ministry for Food and 
Agriculture 
 
RMfdbO Reichsministerium fűr die besetzten Ostgebiete, Reich Ministry for the 
Occupied Eastern Territories 
 
RNS Reichsnährstand,  
 
RSHA Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Reich Security Main Office 
 
RuSHA Rasse und Siedlungs-Hauptamt, Race and Settlement Office 
 
SS Schutz-Staffel, Protection Squad  
 
VF Verwaltungsfűhrer, Administration Leader 
 








Reichsfűhrer   Commander in Chief 
 
Obergruppenfűhrer  General 
 
Gruppenfűhrer  Lieutenant General 
 
Brigardefűhrer  Major General 
 
Standartenfűhrer  Colonel 
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Dr. Herbert Backe, State Secretary Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture1933; Reich 
Peasant leader (Reichsbauernfűhrer) and Reich Minister 1943. 
Born May 1, 1896 in Batum (Kaukasus), World War I veteran and Russian POW. Field 
of interest: agrarian politics, considered himself Landwirt alter Schule232 
 
Gottlob Berger, SS-Obergruppenfűhrer, head of the Chief Command Office of the SS, 
Liason Officer Ministry of the East, Head of Police Division in Reich Ministry for Eastern 
Territories, SS-Hauptamt (SS-HA) 
 
Dr. Otto Bräutigam233, Abteilung I/1, assistant to Georg Leibbrandt, head of the 
Eastern Political Department. Head of the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost Nov 1939-Mai 1940. 
 
Dr. Richard Walther Darrė, Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture 1933-1942, Reich 
Peasant Leader 1933 to 1945, founder RuSHA 1931, head of RuSHA 1931 to 1938. 
Born July 14, 1893 in Argentina.  Schooling in Argentina, Heidelberg, Great Britain and 
Colonial School, Witzenhausen.  World War I veteran in a field artillery detachment.  
Stationed in Frankfurt/Main during the 1918 revolution.  Member of Stahlhelm 1923.  
Worked after the war in Bavaria as a farmer; received 1925 his diploma. Worked in 
Finnland and Estland, member NSDAP1930. Meet Hitler in 1930 and received ‘orders’ 
to organize the peasants.234 Field of interest: animal husbandry, genetics, race, geo 
politics. Editor NS-Landpost 
 
Werner Daitz, Nazi economist and head of the Central Research Institute for National 
Economic Order and Larger Area Economics who proposed German expansion politics 
within Europe under German leadership.  
 
Dr. Hans Ehlich, SS-Standartenfűhrer, head of the III B at the Chief Security Office 
 
Franz Ritter von Epp, head of Reichskolonialbund, Reichsstadthalter in Bavaria 
(district 24) 
 
Dr. Hans Frank, head of the occupational authorities in the General Governement.  
Born May 3, 1900, studied law and economics in Munich, Kiel and Vienna.  World War I 
veteran, member Freikorp Epp and Reichswehr. 
 
Ulrich Greifelt, head of the Stabshauptamt, Head of the Office for Immigration, 
Personal Stab RfSS June 1939 renamed Dienststelle des RKF. SS-Obergruppenfűhrer 
Reinhardt Heydrich, SS-Obergruppenfűhrer, Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, joined 
the NSDAP and SS in 1931, became head of the Chief Security Office 1932, President 
of the International Criminal Police Commission 1940; head of the 
Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), born March 1904, joined the Freikorps after WWI, 
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233 Otto Brautigam. So hat es sich zugetragen. Wűrzburg 1968. 
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joined German navy but was dismissed in 1930, considered the ‘architect’ of the 
Holocaust, chaired Wannsee conference, assasinated June 1942. 
 
Richard Hildebrandt, SS-Obergruppenfűhrer in the RuSHA. 
 
Heinrich Himmler, Reichsfűhrer SS and Chief of German Police, joined the NSDAP 
1925, from 1929 to 1945 Reichsfűhrer SS, Gauleiter Bavaria 1925, Assistant 
Reichspropagandaleiter 1926, member Reichstag 1930, Police President Munich and 
head of Political Police 1933, Commander Prussian Police and Gestapo, 
Reichskommissar fűr die Festigung des deutschen Volkstums (RKFDV) 1939 to 1945. 
Editor of Volk und Rasse. Committed suicide. 
 
Otto Hoffmann, SS-Gruppenfűhrer, Chief of the Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt from 
1939 to 1943. Born 1896, died 1982. joined NSDAP 1923, Alter Kämpfer, joined SS in 
1931 
 
Dr Kleist, head of the Ostland section. 
 
Kurt Klemm, General district Zhytomyr (till 1942), born January 1894, died Nov 1973, 
lawyer. Membership NSDAP since 1931, police chief in Recklinghausen 1932. 
 
Erich Koch, Reichskommisar for the Ukraine, Born June 19, 1896, World War I veteran 
and Freikorps member. Membership NSDAP 1922; Gauleiter in East-Prussia 1928 and 
member of the Reichstag since September 1930.  SA Obergruppenfűhrer 1938, 
Reichsverteidigungskommisar in East-Prussia 1939, head of the civil government in 
Bialystock, since Sep 1941 Reichskommissar for the Ukraine. 
 
Hellmut Körner, Agriculture and food expert, subordinate of Koch.  Born February 16, 
1904, World War I veteran, 3-year apprenticeship in agriculture, studied agriculture in 
Leipzig, diploma as Akademisch Gebildeter Landwirt235, member of the Reichstag. 
 
Wilhelm Koppe, SS-Gruppenfűhrer, General der Polizei, SD Hauptamt 1938, HSSPF 
XXI Wartheland 1940, HSSPF Generalgovernement 1943. 
 
Dr. Georg Leibbrandt, Director of the Eastern Division of the NSDAP Foreign Office, 
Director of Political Development in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern 
Territories 
 
Hinrich Lohse, Reichskommissar fűr das Ostland. Born Sep 2, 1896, World War I 
veteran, party member since 1921, Gauleiter in Schleswig-Holstein since 1925, member 
Reichstag since 1932.  
 
Werner Lorenz, head of the Vo-Mi, SS-Obergruppenfűhrer, born Oct 1891, General of 
the Police, head of the Foreign Volksbund. 
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Waldemar Magunia, SA-Oberfűhrer, generaldistrict Zhytomyr, (after 1942), born 
December 1902, died February 1974, Freikorp member, party member since 1921, SA-
leader in East Prussia, Chief DAF in East Prussia 1937-1941 
 
Prof. Dr. Konrad Meyer-Hetling, Leiter Hauptabteilung II, Plannung (later Amt VI), 
Director Institute of Agrarian Affairs and Agrarian Policy, Universität Berlin, SS 
Standartenfűhrer, Beauftragter fűr die Siedlung und Landesraumordnung beim 
Reichsleiter fűr Agrarpolitik (Ministry of Food and Agriculture), Bauernfűhrer of the 
Reich, born May 1905. 
 
Alfred Rosenberg, Nazi ideologist, Born 1893 in Estonia, member of the Thule-sect 
and since 1921 member NSDAP. Publisher of the Protokol of Zion in 1923, editor-in-
chief of the Völkischer Beobachter from 1925-1945. Took part in the march to the 
Feldherrenhalle 1923, member Reichstag 1930, head of the Aussenpolitische Amt 
NSDAP 1933,Reichsbeauftragter fűr weltanschauliche Schulung und Erziehung NSDAP 
from 1934-1941, head of the ERR (Einsatzstab Rosenberg) 1940 in charge of 
confiscation of art objects and pictures in the occupied territories; 1941Reichsminister 
for the Occupied Eastern Territories, died 1946.  
 
Dr. Karl Stumpp, Chief Sonderkommando Ukraine, Referent fűr Volksdeutsche Fragen 
(ethnic German questions) 
 
Dr. Erhard Wetzel, born 1903 in Stettin, studied law, Amtsgerichtsrat (counsel to the 
magistrate), Ministerialrat, member NSDAP May 1933 (Maikäfer), joined OMi in 1941, 
Gruppe III B RSHA, worked in Kurfűrstenstrasse.  
 
Werner Willikens, born 1893 in Bienenburg; Field Artillery Regiment 24, Alter Kämpfer, 
member NSDAP, member of Reichstag since 1928, Reichslandbundpräsident, 
Stellvertreter Darre’s.236 
 
                                                 
















 Reichskommissariat Ukraine Villages  Towns  Ethnic Germans 
Zhytomyr   193   1  43.988 
Kiev         15.706 
Nikolajew     62     27.078 
Dnjepr    194     76.737 
Crimea         5565 




Settlement Area   Villages  Town  Ethnic Germans 
Hegewald   28    8915 
Försterstadt   24    9036 
Zwiahel    23    4493 
Pulin    22    4517 
Goroschki   48    8327 
Zhytomyr Stadt   27  1  5666 
Tschepetka     6    1818 
Tschudno   15    1216 
 
TOTAL    193  1  43.988 
 
 
The 28 settlements of Hegewald had 1663 children attending 24 schools, with 43 teachers, 2 childcare centers, 1 
physician, 3 German grocery stores, and 8 meeting facilities. Neither a drugstore, nor nursing facility or ambulance 
services were available.238 
 
 
Table 1. Hegewald Settlements239 
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